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Abstract
In April 2012, Angola celebrated ten years of a peace deal which contained an amnesty law. The 
Angolan government has over the past ten years demonstrated to be unwilling to prosecute perpe-
trators of war crimes. Potential war criminals currently (still) take important positions in the 
Angolan government or live as well known public figures in- and outside Angola. The author analy-
ses that especially a lack of domestic interest in doing justice and third countries’ interests in 
Angola’s oil reserves might serve as an explanation why up to this moment no justice has been done. 
The Angolan case illustrates how international actors may react by taking a ‘one-day principled 
position’ when it comes to calling for prosecution. Potentially hampering fragile peace negotiations, 
critique on the blanket nature of the amnesty is before and immediately after the peace process 
voiced, not to be repeated anytime, anyplace, anywhere.
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1. Introduction
Since the ‘norms entrepreneurs’1 and ‘advocates of international justice’ began to 
spread their ‘no peace without justice’ mantra during the nineties of the last cen-
tury,2 it has increasingly become an accepted principle that states should not 
grant amnesty to perpetrators of international crimes. As M. Cherif Bassiouni 
states:3 “The realpolitik of reaching political settlements without regard to a post-
conflict justice component is no longer acceptable.” While granting amnesties as 
part of a negotiated peace deal was common practice in the seventies and eighties, 
this has over the past decade been severely challenged. Indeed, the possibility to 
*) E-mail: j.van.wijk@vu.nl.
1) Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, ‘Trials and Errors; principle and pragmatism in strategies of 
international justice’, International Security, 28, 3 (Winter 2003/4), p. 8.
2) Michael P. Scharf, ‘Trading justice for peace: The contemporary law and policy debate’, in Edel 
Hughes, William A. Shabas and Ramesh Thakur, (eds.), Atrocities and International Accountability: 
beyond Transitional Justice (United Nations University Press, New York, 2007), p. 247.
3) M. Cherif Bassiouni, ‘Accountability for Violations of International Humanitarian Law and 
Other Serious Violations of Human Rights’, in M. Cherif Bassiouni (ed.), Post-conflict Justice 
(Transnational Publishers Inc., New York, 2002), p. 3.
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grant a ’blanket’ amnesty to all perpetrators as a means to end a conflict and pro-
mote peace has become increasingly restricted.
In April 2002 a large and unconditional blanket amnesty was granted in 
Angola. It marked the end of a three decade long civil war. The amnesty was 
granted three months before the Rome Statute entered into force in July 2002. 
Just before a large part of the international community formally agreed that 
impunity of the most responsible perpetrators of international crimes was intoler-
able, the Angolan government did just that. In a parliamentary approved law the 
government granted amnesty to perpetrators of ”all crimes committed within the 
framework of the armed conflict between the UNITA [União Nacional para a 
Independência Total de Angola, JVW] rebels and the government”.4 After 30 
years of brutal civil war in which thousands of civilians were murdered, tortured 
and raped the Angolan negotiators of the peace agreement chose to bypass the 
latest developments in international law.
This article gives a brief sketch of the background of the peace process that led 
to the amnesty and describes the domestic and international reactions to this 
often ‘forgotten’ and yet so recent blanket amnesty. At a domestic level there are 
no indications of any actions leading to prosecution. Although many members of 
the international community before and immediately after the peace deal voiced 
a principled position against the Angolan amnesty law, this aticle suggests that all 
international actors quickly adopted a much more pragmatic approach. The ini-
tial call for justice in 2002 has soon afterwards been firmly covered with a blanket 
of silence. Especially third countries’ interests in Angola’s oil reserves might serve 
as an explanation why intergovernmental organizations, such as the UN, do not 
openly criticize the Angolan government in this regard. Why NGOs remain 
silent is more difficult to explain. They may feel that it is at this moment better to 
let the past in Angola rest. However, this is not explicitly communicated. The 
article concludes with a call for more research to similar cases and poses the fun-
damental question if it is wise for international actors to take such a ‘one-day 
principled’ stance that perpetrators of international crimes should not be 
amnestied.
2. Granting Amnesties
There obviously is a reason why many wars in the past have ended in political 
settlements, including limited or general amnesties for perpetrators of war crimes. 
The option to grant amnesty can play a critical role in bringing the different 
4) Conciliation Resources, ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, available at <http://www.c-r.org/
our-work/accord/angola/memorandum-of-understanding.php> (19 October 2011).
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parties of the conflict to the negotiating table. Most commentators therefore 
agree that amnesties can under certain circumstances be justified under interna-
tional law. Scharf and Rodley for example, acknowledge that “governments are 
often presented with a Hobson’s choice between their very survival and the 
demands of justice”.5 They note that while the provisions of international law 
may require prosecution, “the doctrine of force majeure can warrant temporary 
postponement of prosecutions, provided steps are taken without delay to collect 
and preserve relevant evidence.” According to Naqvi amnesties should be in line 
with the following cumulative criteria.6 The amnesty should: 1) be prescribed and 
limited to achieving certain objectives, in particular, the objectives of securing 
peace and initiating or furthering reconciliation; 2) be accompanied by other 
accountability measures such as truth commissions, investigatory bodies, or lus-
tration; 3) not be self-proclaimed, i.e., be the result of negotiation between the 
outgoing and incoming regimes or of a peace deal brokered by international par-
ties, such as the United Nations; and (4) only apply to lower ranking members of 
armed forces or groups or those considered “least responsible” for the perpetra-
tion of international crimes. The South African Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission, which granted individual amnesties under certain specific condi-
tions, is in this respect often referred to as a good example.7
Many of the amnesties in the 1990s were - as suggested by above mentioned 
commentators - accompanied by the parallel establishment of truth commissions, 
as was the case in El Salvador (1991), Haiti (1994), South Africa (1995) and 
Guatamala (1996). With the establishment of the International Criminal Court 
in 2002 all signatories to the Rome Statute expressed that perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes should always be prosecuted, no matter what accompanying activi-
ties are organized. Before, the United Nations had already shifted to such a 
principled doctrine. In 1999 the High Commissioner for Human Rights stated 
that in relation to the situation of East Timor “Impunity for those guilty of these 
shocking violations would be a betrayal of everything the United Nations stands 
for regarding the universal promotion and protection of human rights”.8 Over 
the last decade the United Nations has continued to voice the principle that per-
petrators of serious crimes under international law cannot be granted uncondi-
tional amnesties. In 2004 the Secretary-General stated:
5) Michael P. Scharf and Nigel Rodley, ‘International Law Principles on Accountability’, in M. Cherif 
Bassiouni (ed.), Post Conflict Justice (Transnational Publishers Inc., New York, 2002), p.96.
6) Yasmin Naqvi, ‘Amnesty for War Crimes; Defining the limits of international recognition’. 
IRRC, 851 (2003), p. 617.
7) Jeremy Sarkin, Carrots and Sticks; The TRC and the South African Amnesty Process (Intersentia, 
Antwerp, 2004).
8) United Nations Economic and Social Council, Report of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
on the situation of East Timor (OHCHR/MIS/99/6, 17 September 1999), para. 48.
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Domestic justice systems should be the first resort in pursuit of accountability. But where 
domestic authorities are unwilling or unable to prosecute violators [of international crimes, 
JVW] at home, the role of the international community becomes crucial.9
‘Carefully crafted amnesties’ can help in the return and reintegration of displaced 
civilians and former fighters, but “these can never be permitted to excuse geno-
cide, war crimes, crimes against humanity or gross violations of human rights”.10 
Likewise, international NGOs such as Amnesty International, Human Rights 
Watch, Impunity Watch and TRIAL have, especially over the last years, taken a 
firm position opposing the granting of amnesties to perpetrators of international 
crimes.
How do these actors active in the field of international criminal law react to a 
relatively recent peace process that is not in line with any of the above mentioned 
criteria? What happens when the amnesty ruling is (partly) self-proclaimed and 
when it encompasses all perpetrators, including the most responsible for the most 
serious crimes? What if the amnesty is granted without any accompanying 
accountability components, without collecting relevant evidence, without any 
truth finding, and without any national incentives and initiatives to come to 
reconciliation? Such an amnesty was granted in Angola in 2002.
3. International Crimes Committed in Angola
Angola has in recent history been engaged in a brutal war. Since its independence 
from Portugal in 1975 until 2002 troops of the Movimento popular de libertação 
de Angola (MPLA) have fought União nacional para a independência total de 
Angola (UNITA) for almost three decades. All these years UNITA acted as a rebel 
force lead by its charismatic and undisputed leader Jonas Savimbi, while MPLA 
held the government and was for most of the period headed by the silent techno-
crat José Eduardo dos Santos. It is estimated that at least 500.000 people died as 
a consequence of the civil war.11
It is undisputed that especially in the periods 1992-1994 and 1998-2002 war 
crimes were committed. Although foreign troops from both Cuba and South 
Africa were deployed in the early phases of the Angolan conflict, the latter part of 
 9) United Nations, The rule of law and transitional justice in conflict and post-conflict societies; Report 
of the secretary general (United Nations Report No. S2004/616, Geneva, 2004), p. 14.
10) Ibid., p. 11.
11) For extensive recordings of the history of the Angolan conflict, see: Tony Hodges, Angola, from Afro-
Stalinism to Petro-dollar Capitalism (James Currey Ltd., London, 2001); Justin Pearce, An outbreak 
of Peace: Angola’s situation of confusion (David Phillip, Cape Town, 2005); Michael Gerard 
Comerford, The peaceful face of Angola: Biography of a Peace Process (1991 to 2002) (John Meinert 
Printing, Windhoek, 2005); Assis Malaquias, Rebels and robbers; Violence in post-colonial Angola 
(The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2007).
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the war is generally conceived to be of a non-international character. The defini-
tion of war crimes in an internal armed conflict is given in ‘common article 3’ to 
the four Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949: “This includes for example 
violence to life and person, in particular murder of all kinds, mutilation, cruel 
treatment and torture.” Indeed, there are sufficient indications that such crimes 
have in Angola been committed by UNITA “as part of a plan or large-scale com-
mission”, as the same article 3 prescribes. There is ample evidence that murder, 
taking hostages and summary execution have taken place on a large-scale.12 In 
1999 the President of the UN Security Council issued a statement from which it 
can be deduced that also the UN was aware that UNITA violated the Geneva 
Conventions:
The Security Council urges both parties to ensure full respect for human rights and interna-
tional humanitarian law. In this connection, the Council urges UNITA to cease committing 
atrocities, including killing civilians and attacking humanitarian aid workers, and demands 
the release of all foreign citizens, including the Russian aircrews, held by UNITA.13
In 2001 UNITA claimed responsibility for attacking the city of Caxito, for shoot-
ing a World Food Programme (WFP) plane near Kuito and for attacking a pas-
senger train with 500 refugees in Kwanza Norte. The train hit two mines, derailed 
and burst into flames before guerrillas sprayed it with gunfire. 400 civilians are 
said to have died in these combined attacks.14
Although the United Nations never unambiguously defined UNITA’s actions 
as war crimes, both the Angolan parliament and the Angolan Chief State 
Prosecutor did so. In January 1999 the National Assembly of Angola declared 
Savimbi to be a war criminal and an international terrorist and called for his 
arrest and prosecution. On 18 February that same year, the Chief State Prosecutor 
of Angola indicated that Savimbi would be charged with war crimes and that 
proceedings against him were to be started soon.15 In 2001, immediately after the 
earlier mentioned train attack by UNITA, the Angolan government again urged 
the United Nations to prosecute Savimbi for charges of war crimes.16
12) Amnesty International, Annual Report for Angola available at <http://www.amnestyusa.org/
annualreport.php?id=B080050DBD79FA4280256A0F005BCC45&c=AGO> (October 2009); 
Human Rights Watch , Angola Unravels; the rise and fall of the Lusaka peace proces (Human Rights 
Watch, New York, 1999); José Doria, ‘Angola: a case study in the challenges of achieving peace and 
the question of amnesty or prosecution of war crimes in mixed armed conflicts’, in Horst Fisher and 
Avril Mc Donald (eds.), Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 3, (TMC Asser Press, 
The Hague, 2002).
13) Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council (Security Council, S/
PRST/1999/26, New York).
14) Associated Press, ‘Angola Urges U.N. For War Crimes Charge’, available at <http://nucnews 
.net/nucnews/2001nn/0108nn/010818nn.htm#300> (18 August 2001).
15) <http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/confres/monitor/mntr3_africa1.html> (19 October 2011).
16) Associated Press, ‘Angola Urges U.N. For War Crimes Charge’, available at <http://nucnews 
.net/nucnews/2001nn/0108nn/010818nn.htm#300> (18 August 2001).
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It should be noted that the government itself does not have a clean record 
regarding war crimes either. Human Rights Watch holds Angolan government 
troops responsible for “torture, summary executions, the indiscriminate killing of 
civilians and pillaging during military operations and the use of indiscriminate 
weapons, such as antipersonnel landmines”.17 As part of the counter-insurgency 
strategy ‘Operation Restauro’ in 2001 government troops destroyed villages and 
crops in order to cut of food supply to UNITA. Large numbers of civilians were 
forcefully displaced.18 In other documents government troops are said to have 
recruited children for military service.19 Recruitment of child soldiers is defined 
as a war crime.
3. Peace at Last
3.1. A Blanket Amnesty
When Jonas Savimbi was February 2002 killed by Angolan government troops, 
peace negotiations between the remaining UNITA members and the Angolan 
government started. While negotiating peace the gathering of UNITA troops in 
cantonment camps was the government’s immediate priority. In early April the 
Luena Memorandum of Understanding was signed, which granted a blanket 
amnesty regarding all crimes committed during the conflict. No further provi-
sions were made with respect to complementing methods to come to reconcilia-
tion or truth seeking. That the granting of amnesty in itself - according to the 
government - encompassed the process of reconciliation can be deduced from the 
fact that it was the sole paragraph in the Memorandum under the heading ‘Issues 
of National Reconciliation.’ As a 2009 International Center for Transitional 
Justice report concluded: “In practice, reconciliation has been limited to the war-
ring parties putting aside all past differences, without exploring the causes of the 
conflict.”20
17) Human Rights Watch, Angola Unravels; The Rise and Fall of the Lusaka Peace Process (Human 
Rights Watch, New York, 1999).
18) Medecins Sans Frontières, Angola after the War Abandonment: A Collection of Témognages from 
Angola, (MSF, Geneva, 2002); Assis Malaquias, Rebels and robbers; Violence in post-colonial Angola 
(The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2007), p. 168.
19) Human Rights Watch, Forgotten Fighters; Child Soldiers in Angola (Human Rights Watch, 
New York, 2003); Michael G. Wessells, The recruitment and use of girls in armed forces and groups in 
Angola: implications for ethical research and reintegration (Ford Institute for Human Security, 
Pittsburgh, 2007).
20) International Center for Transitional Justice, Southern African Regional Assessment Mission 
Report; Angola (ICTJ, 2009), p.13. Available at < http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=article&id=1835%3Asouthern-african-regional-assessment-mission-report 
-angola&Itemid=2> (19 October 2011).
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3.2. Reactions in the World
That the Angolan government would opt for granting a blanket amnesty should 
not have come as a surprise to the international community. In 1994 the so-called 
‘Lusaka Protocol’ was set up to foster a peace process in Angola. The Pro tocol 
included that the competent institutions should grant an amnesty for the illegal 
acts committed by anyone in the context of the conflict.21 Article 6 of the Protocol 
literally called the Angolan people to “in the spirit of National Reconciliation . . . 
forgive and forget the offences resulting from the Angolan conflict and face the 
future with tolerance and trust”. The United Nations has never signed the Lusaka 
protocol, but has always voiced to be a keen supporter of its implementation,. Up 
until 2001 the Security Council supported the Government of Angola “in its 
efforts to implement the Lusaka Protocol”.22 No reservations with regards to 
article 6 were made. In this light it is remarkable that less than one year later 
Gambari - representative of the Secretary-General - in April 2002 adopted a res-
ervation into the Memorandum that the UN did not recognize “any general 
amnesty that includes genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes”.23
Though remarkable with regard to the earlier statement of the Security Council, 
the reservation is less remarkable in a broader context. Gambari’s statement was 
in line with the United Nation’s position regarding the peace deal brokered in 
Sierra Leone two years earlier, where the UN also made a reservation regarding 
perpetrators of international crimes.24 Gambari also anticipated to the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights Resolution on Impunity,25 which explicitly 
recognized that:
Amnesties should not be granted to those who commit violations of international humanitar-
ian and human rights law that constitute serious crimes and urges States to take actions in 
accordance with their obligations . . . Crimes such as . . . war crimes . . . are violations of 
international law and . . . perpetrators of such crimes should be prosecuted or extradited.
The UN-position with regard to the Memorandum was supported by inter-
national NGOs such as Amnesty International: “While acknowledging the 
21) Human Rights Watch, supra note 22.
22) Security Council, Security Council sees need to improve effectiveness of sanctions against rebel group 
in Angola (Security Council, Press release SC/7215, 4418th and 4419th meetings, 15 November 
2001) available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2001/sc7215.doc.htm> (19 October 
2011).
23) Security Council, The Situation of Angola (Security Council, 4517th meeting of the Security 
Council, 23 April 2002, S/PV.4517) available at <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-4517.pdf> 
(19 October 2011).
24) Carsten Stahn, ‘United Nations peace-building, amnesties and alternative forms of justice: a 
change in practice?’, IRRC, 84, 845 (2002), p. 199.
25) UNHCHR, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Resolution on Impunity (Resolution 
2002/79, E/2002/23 - E/CN.4/2002/200, Geneva, 2002).
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difficulties in reaching a cease-fire agreement, Amnesty International maintains 
that there can be no reconciliation, and therefore no lasting peace, without both 
truth and justice” stated the organization.26 Human Rights Watch has as far as we 
could find not issued any press release after the brokered peace deal.
The position of the European Union with regard to the amnesty process in 
Angola has always been mysterious. The European Union representative in the 
Security Council stated in 2001 that “the European Union welcomed the 
Government’s offer of amnesty”.27 A Presidency Statement on behalf of the 
European Union in that same year was more cryptic. First it was stated that 
“The European Union strongly condemns the attack by UNITA near the town of 
Caxito . . . and stresses the importance of bringing the perpetrators to justice”, 
only lines later to be followed by the statement that “A peaceful and lasting solu-
tion to the conflict, based on the Lusaka Protocol, is necessary” and that “the 
European Union is encouraged by some recent developments, including the 
Amnesty Law”.28 In December 2002 the European Union congratulated the 
Angolan Government and UNITA for the “strong political will shown in achiev-
ing the goal of peace and national reconciliation.” No reservations were made 
with regard to the Amnesty Law.29 The US State Department issued a statement 
that Washington looked forward to the full completion of the peace agreement 
and further steps to promote national reconciliation. Russia and Portugal reacted 
positively as well.30 There are no indications that any of these countries made 
specific reservations with regard to the amnesty law.
3.3. Reactions in Angola
Within Angola itself the reservation delivered by the United Nations was received 
with mixed feelings. Some local NGOs supported the UN position because they 
disliked an amnesty that provided impunity for human rights violations and war 
crimes.31 For the same reason some sixty smaller political parties questioned the 
26) Amnesty International, Angola; a new ceasefire; a new opportunity for human rights. available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR12/002/2002/en/eb6644c8-d864-11dd-9df8 
-936c90684588/afr120022002en.html> (5 April 2002).
27) Security Council, supra note 27.
28) European Union, ‘Common foreign and security policy’ ((14/27), Bulletin EU, 1.6.14, 2001) 
available at <http://europa.eu/bulletin/en/200105/p106014.htm> (October 2009).
29) European Union, Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union concerning the 
Peace Process in Angola (Reference PESC/02/175, Brussels, 2 December 2002) available at <http://
europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PESC/02/175&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en> (19 October 2011).
30) BBC, ‘Angolans celebrate peace deal’ available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/1912761 
.stm> (5 April 2002).
31) Amnesty International, 2003 Annual Report for Angola available at <http://www.amnestyusa 
.org/annualreport.php?id=B3ADE3AA5C6624C680256D24003790EB&c=AGO> 
(October 2009).
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amnesty in a letter to the President.32 Angolan media however, generally reflected 
an angry public reaction to Gambari’s expressions. People feared that UNITA-
combatants might believe this statement could negate the Amnesty Law.33 As 
Gambari himself explained to the Security Council, the statement of principle 
had “left some apprehension in the minds of UNITA and some people in the 
armed forces of Angola, as well as in some segments of civil society, who felt that 
this position by the United Nations may undermine the peace process”.34 In the 
end, the UN position was negated and did not change the peace building process. 
The Luena Memorandum was accepted and the blanket amnesty was granted.
3.4. Duty to Prosecute?
The crimes committed in the Angolan civil war do not fall under the jurisdiction 
of the International Criminal Court. Angola has not ratified the Rome Statute 
and the crimes were committed before 2002. Angola is party to the Geneva 
Conventions which means that it has an obligation to search for, prosecute and 
punish perpetrators of war crimes committed during international armed con-
flicts.35 But as mentioned above, the war is generally conceived to be of a non-
international character. With respect to non-international armed conflicts article 
6(5) of the Additional Protocol II actually prescribes a completely contradictory 
reaction of the state parties. The provision states that at the end of hostilities 
“Authorities in power shall endeavour to grant the broadest possible amnesty to 
persons who have participated in the armed conflict, or those deprived of their 
liberty for reasons related to the armed conflict, whether they are interned or 
detained”. The rationale of this provision is to promote reconciliation, which is 
believed to be of greater importance in non-international conflicts than in inter-
national conflicts.36 Doria therefore voices the opinion that states have the option 
of conceding amnesties at the end of internal conflicts, even for war crimes.37  
The observation that the international community not only condemns but at 
32) Aaron Griffiths, ‘The end of the war; The Luena memorandum of understanding’, in Guus 
Meijer (ed.), From military peace to social justice?: The Angolan peace process (Conciliation Resources 
‘Accord’, London, 2004), pp. 24-27.
33) Security Council, The Situation of Angola (Security Council, 4517th meeting of the Security 
Council, 23 April 2002, S/PV.4517) available at <http://www.undemocracy.com/S-PV-4517.pdf> 
(19 October 2011).
34) Ibid.
35) Geneva Conventions, I, article 49, II, Article 50, III, Article 129, IV, article 146.
36) Claude Pilloud et al, Commentary on the Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva 
Conventions of 12 August 1949 (International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1987), p.1402; 
Michael P. Scharf, supra note 3, p. 254.
37) José Doria, ‘Angola: a case study in the challenges of achieving peace and the question of amnesty 
or prosecution of war crimes in mixed armed conflicts’, in Horst Fisher and Avril Mc Donald (eds.), 
Yearbook of International Humanitarian Law, Volume 3, (TMC Asser Press, The Hague, 2002), 
p. 60.
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times also encourages amnesties - such as was the case in Mozambique 1992 or 
South Africa in 1994 - to Doria’s opinion “reinforces the rule that prosecution of 
violations of the law of international armed conflicts should be considered only 
one of the alternative rights of the territorial state of jurisdiction”.38
Although the Geneva Conventions thus promote granting amnesty when con-
flicts of a non-international nature have ended, the United Nations has over the 
last years continuously and unambiguously promoted the prosecution of sus-
pected war criminals. Regarding the internal conflicts in Nepal,39 Afghanistan40 
and Kenya the UN has for example called for justice instead of amnesties.41 This 
leads us to conclude that based on the Geneva Conventions the Angolan govern-
ment might not have a formal duty to prosecute war criminals, but in conformity 
with the United Nations statements in similar situations and in conformity with 
the latest developments in international criminal law it should.
3.5. Investigation and Prosecution so Far
Based on speeches and publications we conclude that the Angolan government 
supports the principled position of the United Nations that war criminals - 
whether active during international or non-international conflicts - should be 
prosecuted. The Angolan government has in the international arena continuously 
demonstrated to favour the UN position. It was one of the very first States to sign 
the Rome Statute on October 1998. At the signing ceremony in Rome, Angola’s 
Minister of Justice stressed the need to punish perpetrators of war crimes and 
implored the Rome delegates to make the ICC effective.42 In 2001 he underlined 
that Angolan basic law recognizes the primacy of international law over national 
laws in that it requires that “legal norms be interpreted and integrated in line 
with . . . international instruments to which Angola is a party”.43 In a 2003 meet-
ing of the Security Council, the Angolan representative expressed the importance 
38) Ibid., p. 44.
39) United Nations, ‘UN Rights Chief Warns Against Amnesty For Human Rights Offenders In 
Nepal’ available at <http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/detail/40322.html> (24 January 
2007).
40) Reuters, ‘U.N. rights boss Arbour condems Afghan amnesty’ available at <http://www.reuters 
.com/article/topNews/idUSL0792095920070207> (7 February 2007).
41) Robert Evans, ‘U.N. team tells Kenya not to grant amnesty’ available at <http://www.alertnet 
.org/thenews/newsdesk/L19101237.htm> (October 2009).
42) Paul J. Magnarella, ‘New world court targets war crimes; will the International Criminal Court 
meet Africa’s expectations?’ Africa Recovery, 12, 2 (1998) available at <http://www.un.org/ 
ecosocdev/geninfo/afrec/vol12no2/warcourt.htm> (19 October 2011).
43) PGA, International Law and Human Rights Programme International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Campaign Event (Conference on ICC Ratification in Lusophone Countries, Lisbon, 19/20 February 
2001) available at <http://www.pgaction.org/uploadedfiles/09_2001Lisbon_rep.pdf> (19 October 
2011).
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of justice and the rule of law for the Angolan government. He emphasized that 
the gap between commitment and concrete action in the area had to be bridged. 
He furthermore stressed that the Security Council had taken major steps to 
strengthen the rule of law in Africa by establishing special criminal courts for 
Rwanda and Sierra Leone.44
So far for theory. In order to find out what position the Angolan government 
in practice holds, one has to judge its actions. This offers quite a different perspec-
tive. Eight years down the line, there has been no single prosecution in Angola of 
a war criminal. It seems safe to conclude that so far even no concrete steps have 
been taken to start any investigations. How could it be explained that the Angolan 
government, notwithstanding its keen endorsement of the newest developments 
in international criminal law, has so far shown no initiatives when it comes to act 
in its own country?
3.6. Unable to Prosecute?
A possible explanation why investigations do not take place could be that the 
Angolan government is unable to do so. Setting up and organizing an effective 
justice system is expensive and complex. Countries like Sierra Leone and Rwanda 
would never have managed to organize their Special Courts (or even their national 
courts) if the international community had not financially contributed. This 
explanation that Angola is not in the position to finance such a project, does 
however not hold truth. Angola would very well be in the position to finance all 
these reforms. It is the second biggest African oil producing nation. Over the last 
three years the Angolan economy has grown with a staggering 20 per cent a year. 
As Todd Howland,45 former employee of the Human Rights Division of the 
peacekeeping and peace building missions of the United Nations states: “Angola 
has the resources . . . to have a viable court system functioning throughout the 
country.”
Lack of power does neither seem to constitute a problem. Since the peace 
agreement the MPLA-government has constantly been in political, economic 
and military power. Nor UNITA, neither any other party has over the last seven 
years seriously challenged the power base of the MPLA-government. As Kibble 
observes:46 “The army is well trained and large.” Finding any potential war 
44) United Nations, ‘Security Council calls on member states to help enhance UN role in establish-
ing justice, rule of law in post-conflict states’ (United Nations, . 4833rd Meeting, Press Release 
SC/7880, 24 September 2003) available at <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7880 
.doc.htm> (19 October 2011).
45) Todd Howland, ‘UN Human rights field presence as proactive instrument o peace and social 
change; lessons from Angola’, Human Rights Quarterly, 26, 1 (2004), p. 28.
46) Steve Kibble, ‘Angola: can the politics of disorder become the politics of democratization & 
development?’, Review of African Political Economy, 33, 109 (2006), p. 534.
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criminals is not hard either. Potential war criminals of the government troops 
have remained in the army and very few former high ranking UNITA militants 
hided away or emigrated. Instead, they are currently well-known public figures 
who hold important political, military, or business positions and publicly talk 
and write about their past.47 As part of the disarmament, demobilization and 
reintegration programme at least thirty well known ex-UNITA officers simply 
switched army.48 Certain lower ranking UNITA-members who personally 
directed and executed war crimes are also known. Human Rights Watch for 
example collected over one hundred testimonies from Angolans who survived or 
witnessed atrocities by UNITA forces. These villagers describe by name and rank 
which perpetrators committed which atrocities.49 The names of the victims are 
known, the names of the witnesses are known, the names of the actual perpetra-
tors of war crimes are known, and the names and whereabouts of leading officers 
who potentially directed or ordered rebels to commit such war crimes are known. 
When it wants, the Angolan government is able to detect war criminals and start 
prosecutions.
3.7. Unwilling to Prosecute?
Seen in the light of the above, the foremost reason why investigations and pros-
ecutions have so far not taken place seems to be that the Angolan government is 
unwilling to prosecute war criminals. Given the fact that the government has 
since 1989 consequently promoted trading off peace for amnesty,50 it does not 
seem to see any moral blockades in granting amnesties. The ‘politics of clemency’ 
are a preferred strategy by the MPLA-government to bring a halt to its internal 
47) Agostinho Rodrigues, ‘“Nunca mais haverá Guerra entre os Angolanos”, garante o General 
Kamorteiro.’ (4 April 2005), available at <http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id 
=4691<b> (19 October 2011); Angola Digital, ‘Autobiografia de Samuel Chiwale quer repor certos 
factos históricos’ available at <http://www.angoladigital.net/digitalnews/index.php?option=com 
_content&task=view&id=5282&Itemid=40> (11 August 2008).
48) BBC, ‘Angola’s war ‘is over’.’ available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/2168871.stm> 
(2 August 2002).
49) Human Rights Watch, supra note 22.
50) Already in 1989 the MPLA had offered UNITA a general amnesty and integration into the 
government (Moisés Venâncio, The United Nations, Peace and Transition: Lessons from Angola 
(Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, Lisbon, 1994) p.27; Assis Malaquias, Rebels and 
robbers; Violence in post-colonial Angola (The Nordic Africa Institute, Uppsala, 2007) p. 143. In the 
1991 Bicesse Accords a de facto a deal was settled that no prosecution would take place. The 1994 
Lusaka protocol provided an amnesty for all illegal acts committed in the context of the civil war. 
In 2002 - after Savimbi died - the government offered the amnesty as part of the Luena 
Memorandum. In 2006 the government agreed to issue yet another amnesty to various secessionist 
movements from the province Cabinda (Angop, ‘Governo aprova memorando de paz para Cabinda 
e projeto de Lei de Amnistia’ available at <http://www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id 
=10947%3Cb> (28 July 2006).
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conflicts, notwithstanding its general claim to uphold the rule of international 
criminal law.
It is clear that starting prosecutions or investigations would risk opening a can 
of worms. The government would have to start investigating and prosecuting 
officers of its own army and important businessmen and politicians. Why open 
Pandora’s Box when there is peace at last? Forgetting has even become more or 
less an official policy. The 4th of April 2005, while remembering the third anniver-
sary of the peace accord, the Angolan government issued the official statement 
that “The Angolans have to regain their self respect, they have to look to tomor-
row with confidence, leave the problems of the past and walk together to the 
future”.51 The middle- and upper class are doing better than ever. With the oil 
dollars coming in by the billions, rotten shanty downs being replaced by 
fancy Chinese built skyscrapers and guarded condominiums popping up by 
the dozens, even the poorest Angolans that have been most affected by the 
war may see little reason to call for justice. After thirty years of war, economic 
decline and dictatorship things have changed for the good over the past six years. 
The rich may have become richer, but so have the poor. Minefields are cleared, 
farmers can farm, trains are running and the once sky rocketing inflation has 
come to a halt. They can visit their family via newly built roads, and sell 
their products at the market. What’s more, September 2008 the first parliamen-
tary elections took place. Observers of the Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) proclaimed the elections to be transparent and credible, 
while observers of the European Union and Human Rights Watch voiced 
some mild reservations.52 The MPLA won with a landslide victory of 81,7 per 
cent of the vote. In the run off for these elections an occasional politician 
referred to the war,53 but in general the focus was on the future, rather than on 
the past.
Though there are obvious shortcomings concerning the rule of law in Angola 
and though the country is still very poor, the overall mood is positive. After thirty 
years of civil war, the people of Angola experience relative freedom, security and 
stability at last. Bringing up memories about the civil war, investigating and pros-
ecuting the former crimes of currently powerful politicians and generals might 
have a negative impact on the current peace building efforts. The Angolan 
government does not have an interest in the potentially destabilizing effects of 
51) Lusa, ‘Governo apela á tolerância nas comemorações do terceiro ano de paz’ available at <http://
www.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=4688%3Cb> (4 April 2005).
52) BBC, ‘Observers unsure over Angola poll’ available at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
africa/7603735.stm> (8 September 2008); Human Rights Watch, Democracy or Monopoly; Angola’s 
Reluctant Return to Elections (Human Rights Watch, New York, 2009).
53) A spokesman of the MPLA said in April for example: “UNITA has to reflect on what it did in 
the past.” (Apostolado, ‘UNITA tem que reflectir o que fez no passado’, available at <http://www 
.angonoticias.com/full_headlines.php?id=19061<b> (6 April 2008).
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investigations into war crimes. It might cause conflict in its own ranks, stir up old 
antagonism and consequently jeopardize the sustainability of peace.
3.8. Reactions Ten Years Down the Line
As stated above Scharf & Rodley argue that states may delay prosecutions for a 
reasonable amount of time until,54 for example, a new government is secure 
enough to take such action against members of the former regime, or a new gov-
ernment has the judicial resources to undertake fair and effective prosecutions. It 
is safe to conclude that the Angolan government is secure enough and has the 
judicial resources but seems unwilling to prosecute its war criminals. Seen in this 
light, it is remarkable that the whole international community and large NGOs 
have over the last seven years kept completely silent vis-à-vis this unwillingness. 
What could they have done?
3.8.1 Arrest Warrants
Nothing bars individual nation states to take legal actions based on universal 
jurisdiction. Even when a conflict is domestic, inasmuch as fundamental princi-
ples of international humanitarian law have been violated its consequences are 
regarded to affect the entire international community. Any nation state can issue 
an arrest warrant for persons that it deems responsible for violating international 
humanitarian law. In that case it is not acting on behalf of its own domestic legal 
order, but on behalf of the international legal order.55 Several individual states 
have already prosecuted perpetrators of international crimes on the basis of uni-
versal jurisdiction: the former Chilean dictator Pinochet was arrested by the 
British authorities and a Belgian Court charged the former Chadian president 
Hissène Habré. In countries like Austria, The Netherlands, Switzerland and the 
United Kingdom it regularly occurs that asylum seekers suspected of war crimes 
or crimes against humanity are arrested and prosecuted.56 Two relatively well 
documented cases in Angola that could be used as a starting point for arrest war-
rants based on universal jurisdiction are the earlier mentioned attacks in 2001 on 
the WFP-plane in which 23 civilians and UN staff died and on the trains in 
which 250 civilians are said to have died. High ranking former UNITA leaders 
who have integrated in the Angolan army and might bear command responsibil-
ity for these atrocities are known by name and rank and regularly leave the 
country.
54) Michael P. Scharf and Nigel Rodley,. supra note 8.
55) Menno T. Kamminga, ‘Lessons learned from the exercise of universal jurisdiction in respect of 
gross human rights violations’, Human Rights Quarterly, 23, 4 (2001) p. 943.
56) Redress, Universal Jurisdiction Developments: January 2006- May 2009 (Redress, London, 2009).
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Issuing a warrant of arrest for citizens of a befriended nation - which Angola to 
most countries is - is obviously a very big step that could constitute major nega-
tive political, diplomatic and economic consequences for the country that asks 
for extradition. Another, less threatening option is to actively lobby for prosecu-
tion. The fact that this has so far not happened might have something to do with 
Angola’s strategic position. As mentioned before, Angola’s economy is rapidly 
growing. It produces diamonds, has a large financial sector and most importantly, 
vast hydrocarbon reserves. Oil companies continue to expand their stakes in 
Angola to the present day.57 For this reason, as Malaquias suggests,58 Angola to a 
large extent has become “The West’s new best friend”. Other than for example 
Sierra Leone or Rwanda, Angola did not need assistance of the international 
community to rebuild the country. It refused to accept the proposed structural 
reforms of IMF and the World Bank. Instead, from 2004 onwards it directed its 
attention to China and received some billions worth oil-backed loans.59 These 
allow Angola to act independently and forego any pressure from the international 
community with regard to transparency of oil contracts or human rights issues. 
The same goes for prosecution of war criminals. It would be strange if these vested 
corporate interests do not impact Western governments’ stance towards the lack 
of an appropriate response towards human rights abuses by Angolan authorities. 
Very few countries are in the position to direct Angola’s government. Angola did 
not and still does not need the assistance of anyone. It is rather the other way 
around; with all the oil that it has, the world needs Angola.
3.8.2 Lobby
What is more intriguing, however, is that no representative of the United Nations 
and none of the international NGOs have over the past years actively propagated 
prosecution of war criminals in Angola. The silent position of the United Nations 
might be explained because it depends largely on the political unity of member 
states. As Messiant explains the interests of the ‘real’ international community - 
the great powers and transnational corporations - have always provided the 
context for and strongly influenced the attitude of the ‘official’ international com-
munity (the United Nations).60 NGOs however, do not face any political pressure 
to (not) take a position. They may risk expulsion, but this has so far not withheld 
them in other circumstances. While many international NGOs have over the last 
years extensively lobbied for prosecution of perpetrators in Sierra Leone, former 
57) Davis Sogge, ‘Angola, ‘Failed’ yet ‘successful’’ (FRIDE Working paper 81, Madrid, 2009)
58) Assis Malaquias, Rebels and Robbers; Violence in Post-colonial Angola (The Nordic Africa Institute, 
Uppsala, 2007), p. 227.
59) Kibble, supra note 55, p. 529.
60) Christine Messiant, ‘Why did Bicesse and Lusaka fail? A critical analysis’, in Guus Meijer (ed.), 
From Military Peace to Social Justice?: The Angolan Peace Process (Conciliation Resources ‘Accord’, 
London, 2004).
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Yugoslavia, Sudan and Uganda, they never focused on Angola. Why cry out loud 
that difficult to arrest perpetrators of international crimes in Sudan, Uganda and 
Libya need to be brought to justice, while ‘available’ perpetrators of war crimes in 
Angola are not targeted? The crimes committed were not less serious and the 
perpetrators are not less responsible. After their initial expressions of ‘concern’ 
that the blanket amnesty would lead to impunity, these NGOs seem to have 
missed that a situation of impunity indeed is taking place.
In a press release commenting the Luena Peace Memorandum in 2002, 
Amnesty International unambiguously opposed the amnesty and called on “the 
authorities, all political parties and civil society in Angola to develop a compre-
hensive strategy to end impunity and ensure full protection of human rights”. It 
furthermore called on “the international community to support Angola in this 
endeavour”.61 In the Amnesty International Year Reports 2004-2011 it is not 
mentioned once that investigations into, or prosecution of war criminals in 
Angola have not yet started, let alone that the Angolan government or the inter-
national community is pushed to start acting.
Human Rights Watch has acted similarly. Its mission statement is: “We stand 
with victims and activists to prevent discrimination . . . and to bring offenders to 
justice.”62 In a 2009 report it argues that lack of accountability is likely to lead to 
negative effects.63 The failed amnesties in Angola in 1991 and 1994 are taken as 
an example: “The successive failed efforts to broker peace with promises of 
amnesty in Angola are another example of impunity failing to achieve the desired 
results.”64 Regarding the 2002 amnesty it however states: “in this instance . . . the 
Luena Accord did bring an end to the conflict.” Could this maybe explain why 
the organization has ever since the Luena Accord never publicly called for bring-
ing the war crime offenders to justice?
Angolan based NGOs also do not actively lobby for prosecution of war crimi-
nals. During the conflict these organizations often voiced a call for peace and 
reconciliation,65 while they in the post-conflict era mainly call for implementa-
tion of human rights, emancipation and democratization. They criticize the gov-
ernment for the poor execution of reintegration strategies of former UNITA 
soldiers, lack of transparency and corruption, but are far less committed to see 
perpetrators of war crimes held accountable. The few NGOs that do bring up 
61) Amnesty International, Angola; a new ceasefire; a new opportunity for human rights, available at 
<http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/AFR12/002/2002/en/eb6644c8-d864-11dd-9df8 
-936c90684588/afr120022002en.html> (5 April 2002).
62) <http://www.hrw.org/en/about> (19 October 2011).
63) Human Rights Watch, Selling Justice Short; Why Accountability Matters for Peace (Human Rights 
Watch, New York, 2009).
64) Ibid. p. 68.
65) Michael Gerard Comerford, The Peaceful Face of Angola: Biography of a Peace Process (1991 to 
2002) (John Meinert Printing, Windhoek, 2005), p. 125.
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issues about dealing with the past, rather ask for truth seeking than for doing 
justice. The most active post-war lobby for truth seeking in Angola was set up by 
relatives of (supposed) opponents of the MPLA who had disappeared or were 
detained during or just after the independence war in 1977.66 Furthermore the 
Namibian based National Society for Human Rights (NSHR) called days after 
the signing of the peace deal for a South African-style Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission.67 A representative of the Angolan NGO ‘Campaign for a 
Democratic Angola’ has called in 2004 for more openness and mechanisms to 
improve reconciliation. A call to bring former war criminals to justice is however 
never voiced. A 2009 study of the International Center for Transitional Justice 
mentions that the complexity of the wounds suffered by the Angolan people has 
made a number of civil society activists believe that criminal prosecution would 
not be a favourable option today.68 Even the adoption of a Truth Commission 
model such as applied in South Africa was not deemed ideal, since virtually the 
entire country had been involved in the conflict. The struggle of day-to-day exis-
tence, most Angolans still face, leaves little time for such issues of reconciliation. 
As one of the interviewed representatives of civil society put it: “Should we 
[Angolans, JVW] all sit at an Angolan TRC? How can we expect Angolans, 
exhausted from years and years of conflict, to even entertain such an idea?”
3.9. Principled for a Day?
While many advocates of doing justice such as the United Nations, Western 
countries and rights based NGOs in general terms continue to state that granting 
amnesty to perpetrators of war crimes is unacceptable, they in actual practice do 
seem to acknowledge that it might in the specific situation of Angola be better to 
keep silent about its culture of impunity. Seen in the light of the current overall 
positive situation in Angola, this is not surprising. They may feel that at this 
moment it is better to let the past in Angola rest. Just like the Angolan govern-
ment, they might feel that prosecuting war criminals who currently hold impor-
tant positions in the Angolan administration might only stir up political 
antagonism, negatively impact political and economic interests and endanger the 
current peace. Publicly calling for justice could only destabilize the country. 
However, seen in the light of the developments in international criminal law, it is 
surprising that no call for justice is issued. This is supposed to be the century in 
66) A.D. Cordeiro, A verdade toda sobre o 27 de Maio nunca será conhecida, Publico, 27 May.
67) <http://www.irinnews.org/PrintReport.aspx?ReportId=31009> (19 October 2011).
68) International Center for Transitional Justice, Southern African Regional Assessment Mission 
Report; Angola (ICTJ, 2009), p. 13. Available at < http://www.csvr.org.za/index.php?option=com 
_content&view=article&id=1835%3Asouthern-african-regional-assessment-mission-report 
-angola&Itemid=2> (19 October 2011).
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which perpetrators of international crimes do not go unpunished. This is the 
century in which both Angola itself, as the United Nations, as all members of the 
European Union, as large and influential NGOs have spoken out that such per-
petrators cannot and should not escape justice. And it is happening at this very 
moment....
The situation in Angola is therefore interesting for scholars studying transi-
tional justice, the effects of amnesties and a (lack of ) international criminal jus-
tice. Now and in the future. Experiences in Argentina, Chile and Cambodia 
illustrate that it can take decades before once amnestied perpetrators of interna-
tional crimes are brought to justice by national, international or foreign tribunals. 
The recent announcement of Brazilian federal prosecutors to also open criminal 
investigations against once amnestied military officers accused of the enforced 
disappearance of civilians during the 1964-1985 military dictatorship is in line 
with those developments.69 Once powerful, but currently powerless men in their 
seventies or eighties were - and still are - tried before or while they die(d). Are 
Angolan perpetrators perhaps next in line of such delayed justice? Given the lack 
of lobbying from domestic NGOs as well as international actors, it is not very 
likely that this will happen on short notice. It is therefore more likely that Angola 
will at least for the time being continue to be an example of how contrary to 
Bassiouni’s earlier mentioned observation that “The realpolitik of reaching politi-
cal settlements without regard to a post-conflict justice component is no longer 
acceptable”, is in some cases de facto still accepted. While many actors voice a 
principled and unambiguous position that in case international crimes are com-
mitted justice should always be done, the case of Angola illustrates that it is 
apparently possible to be principled for a day.
4. Conclusion
Although international criminal law has evolved in such a way that amnesties for 
perpetrators of war crimes are no longer deemed acceptable, reality proves to be 
more obstinate. Amnesties might not be accepted by lawyers, for diplomats and 
politicians granting amnesty continues to be seen as a suitable solution to broker 
peace. Not only the Angolan amnesty illustrates this, but also other recent amnes-
ties in for example Nepal and Aceh.70 The 2007 amnesty in Afghanistan shows 
that in order to come to a political settlement even by signatories of the Rome 
69) International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Prosecutors announce investigation into 
disappearances during the Brazilian military dictatorship’, available at: http://ictj.org/news/ 
prosecutors-announce-investigation-disappearances-during-brazilian-military-dictatorship (10 
March 2012).
70) Reneé Jeffery, ‘Amnesty and Accountability: The Price of Peace in Aceh, Indonesia’, International 
Journal of Transitional Justice, 6(1), (2012) pp. 60-82.
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Statute blanket amnesties remain to be granted to the (potentially) most serious 
perpetrators of the most serious international crimes.71 In such situations reality 
on the ground does not reflect the idealized world of the international criminal 
law system. The Angolan case shows that many actors in the field of international 
criminal law and politics in such situations may react by taking a ‘one-day prin-
cipled position’. Potentially hampering fragile peace negotiations, critique on the 
blanket nature of the amnesty is voiced before and immediately after the amnesty 
is granted, not to be repeated anytime, anyplace, anywhere.
It seems the Angolan case is no exception in this regard. A call for prosecution 
after amnesty is more often arbitrarily and instrumentally silenced. Think for 
example of Mozambique, where the international community has continuously 
supported a blanket amnesty, or Uganda, where it promotes doing justice for 
rebels, but is generally silent about atrocities committed by government forces.72 
It would in this regard for future research be interesting to meticulously evaluate 
the stances taken by (inter)national actors on situations in other situations where 
in recent history blanket amnesties have been granted. As was done in this article, 
I would suggest to first assess to what extent international crimes have been com-
mitted, secondly if the country is willing and able to start domestic prosecution 
and thirdly to analyse what interests may or may not block a public call or pres-
sure to do justice. Potential pressure from civil society, economic prospects and 
corporate and political interests should at least be taken into account, but it is 
likely that in other contexts other elements can be factored in.
If it turns out that ‘norms entrepreneurs’ and ‘advocates of international jus-
tice’ in general stick to their public call for justice, this leads to the question why 
they do so in these cases, but not in the Angolan case. If, however -because of 
pragmatic reasons- similar ‘one-day principled positions’ of especially interna-
tional actors such as the United Nations, the EU and influential NGOs prove to 
be common practice, this leads to the more fundamental question what goal is 
actually served by voicing this principled position in the first place. Of course it 
reinforces the normative fundamental principle that justice should be done, but 
it might at the same time negatively impact the fragile peace negotiations.
71) Ron Synovitz, ‘Afghanistan: Amnesty Law draws criticism, praise’ available at <http://www.rferl 
.org/content/article/1075272.html> (14 March 2007).
72) Joris van Wijk, ‘Should we ever say Never? Arguments against granting amnesty tested’, in 
R. Letschert et. al. (eds.), Victimological Approaches to International Crimes ( Intersentia, Antwerp, 
2011). pp. 289-314.
